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ABSTRACT
Macroewnomic stabilisation and foreign exchange market interventions are investigated
within the context of a stochastic small open economy. With money demand shocks a peg is
optimal, but with goods demand shocks a nominal income target is best. With supply shocks the
optimal degree of monetary accommodation rises with the welfare weight attached to output rather
than to price stability. A nominal exchange rate band is not advisable from a stabilisation point of
view, albeit that with money demand shocks no welfare losses are incurred. With goods demand
shocks, narrowing the band affects the optimal coefficient of intramarginal monetary
accommodation. With supply shocks and no intramarginal interventions, it is desirable to have a
wider band if there is a relatively large weight on price rather than output stability.
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1 Inlroduction
The by now classic Krugman (1991) model of nominal exchange rate bands has been
overwhelmingly rejected by the data - see Svetuson (1992) for a review. One of the reasons being
that the model predicts that exchange rate distributions should be U-shaped with most of the
probability mass close to the edges of the band, while empirical exchange rate distributions are
hump-shaped with most of the mass near the middle of the band.' Tha Krugman (1991) model
has been extended to allow for mean reversion in the fundamental process by Froot and Obstfeld
(1991) and Delgado and Dumas (1992). Mean reversion and thus the hump-shaped feature of the
empirical exchange rate distributions can be explained by intramazginal interventions which
attempt to keep the exchange rate near the middle of the band - see Lindberg and Sóderlind (1991)
and Beetsma and van der Ploeg (1993). However, to make the macroeconomic analysis of
stabilisation policy more realistic, we need to abandon the strict trtonetary framework and consider
extensions that allow for sticky prices and transitory unemployment.' In fact, these latter
extensions are essential if one seriously wants to discuss the welfaze properties of exchange rate
bands.
Although the implications of the standard Krugman model have been thoroughly
analysed', the question what the stabilisation properties of exchange rate bands are on output,
employment and prices has largely remained unanswered. An exception is Klein (1990), who
introduces shocks to aggregate demand for goods and money supply in a classical model, and s-
hows that a narrower band on the nominal exchange rate leads to greater stabilisation of nominal
and real exchange rates and output. Gros (1990) studies optimal stabilisation in a one-period
model with a standard surprise supply function, imperfect substitution between domestic and
foreign goods, fully flexible prices and a variety of real and monetary shocks. Authorities use
fiscal and monetary policy to stabilise output and to keep the exchange rate in a band. A battd is
defined in a'probabilistic' sense, namely that the probability that the exchange rate should be kept
between its boundaries is above a certain threshold level. This implies a'soft' target zone, with
' Another reason is that the Krugman (1991) model does not allow for realignment risk. Sea Bertola and
Caballero (1992), and Bertola and Svensson (1993).
z See also Miller and Weller (1991), Klein (1990), and Beetsrnan and van der Plceg (1993).
' For example, Svensson (199t) shows that for narrow exchange rate bands, the asymptotic or
uncooditional variance of the interest rate differential (between two countries and at instantaneous maturity)
increases in the bandwidth, but for wide bends it decreases in lhe bandwidth. The instantaneoua interest rate
differential variability is perfectly negalively correlated witó the instantaneous exchange rate variability and
increases tnonotonically when the exchange rate band is narrowed, which is in sharp contrast with a fixed
exchsnge rate regin~ snd, therefore, zero interest rate differential.z
intramarginal interventions only. Unfortunately, no case can be made for an exchange rate band,
because imposing a band involves an additional restriction under which the stabilisation problem is
to be solved. If authorities can make unrestricted use of both monetary and fiscal policy, an
exchange rate band does not induce any welfare losses so that both the income and exchange rate
tazget can be met (in the sense that income is stabilised to the maximum possible extent, while at
the same time the exchange rate restriction is fulfilled). However, if fiscal policy is restricted,
then it might be the case that imposing a band involves welfare losses. Sutherland (1993) uses a
similar model to address the question of the optimal width of a target zone. He defines a target
zone in the 'conventional' way, as a hard band on the nominal exchange rate with the necessary
interventions at the boundaries. From the point of view of macroeconomic stabilisation, he finds
that with only money demand or goods demand shocks a target zone cannot be optimal. However,
with a combination of these two types of shocks, a target zone may be preferred to both a fixed
exchange rate and a free float. The same is true for aggregate supply shocks if authorities care
both about output and price stability.' Svensson (1992b) also uses a classical monetary model
with purchasing power pazity and an exogenously determined output level to study the tradeoff
between various objectives, such as exchange rate and interest rate variability around certain target
levels and smoothing shoR-run exchange rate and interest rate movements. Given these objectives,
authorities choose the optimal (time-consistent) path for the nominal money supply in response to
a variety of shocks. The optimal width of the exchange rate band, which is informally defined as a
range of t3 standard deviations around the unconditional mean of the exchange rate, follows
implicitly from the optimal stabilisation policy'.
One reason that the stabilising properties of exchange rate bands aze largely unexplored is
that usually full price flexibility, purchasing power parity and full employment are assumed.
Hence, for macroeconomic stabilisation, one may as well have a peg or one currency and reap all
the benefits of an optimum currency area. Miller and Weller (1991) extend the analysis to allow
' Because secumulated shocks follow a Brownian motion and there is a band on the fundamental of
whicó the unregula[ed part is a linear combination of accumulated shocks, the money supply becomes nan-
stationary. Moreover, output and prices are non-stationary so thal their asymptotic variances do not exist
and, therefore, cannot be used as a criterion for policy optimisation. As an altemative criterion, Sutherland
(1992) tues unconditional (on the position in the band) expectations of instantaneous variances. He does not
coosider stabilisation policy if the exchange rate is in the interior of its band, i.e. intramarginal
interventions.
' To avoid analytical complications, it is necessary to abstract from an explicit band on the exchange
rate. Svensson (1992) conjectures that this simplification does not dramatically affect the results, because in
the presence of intramarginal interventions the nonlinearity of the exchange rate solution is only significant
close to the boundaries and this is precisely where tlte unconditional exchange tate distribution has relatively
little probability mass.3
for sluggish nominal wage dynamics and transitory unemployment. Within this richer environ-
ment, one is able to distinguish between real and nominal exchange rates. Moreover, in the
presence of nominal wage sluggishness and transitory unemployment, the central bank may be
interested in the accommodation of shocks. Dornbusch (1982) and Alogoskoufis (1989) examine
the effects of monetary accommodation, and of PPP exchange rate rules in particulat~, on
macroeconomic stability in a framework of dirty floating. Frenkel and Aizenman (1982),
Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) and others discuss the optimal degree of monetazy accotttmodation
and fixity of exchange rates if there is a variety of shocks. However, no work has been done on
the effects of monetary accommodation with a nominal exchange rate band.
Hence, the main objective of this paper is to relax the assumptions of purchasing power
parity and full employment prevalent in most of the literature on exchange rate bands, by allowing
for imperfect substitutability between home and foreign goods and introducing wage and price
sluggishness, and to study for various sources of shocks the variability of output and prices under
different exchange rate regimes. In particular, a comparison will be made between stabilisation
policy under an exchange rate band versus under an unrestricted dirty float, which is the limiting
case when the bandwidth goes to infinity. We investigate for which sources of shocks it is
desirable, from a stabilisation perspective, to have a band on the exchange rate.
We extend Sutherland (1993) by allowing for wage-price sluggishness and studying the
effects of monetary accommodation and the combination of infra- and intramarginal interventions.
7ite objective of stabilisation policy is to minimise the variance of temporary deviations of, for
example, outputlemployment (and prices) from long-run equilibrium. However, most existing
models of exchange rate bands imply a non-stationary fundamental so that, with a limited amount
of foreign exchange reserves in the world, the exchange rate band collapses sooner or later
anyway. Depending on the source of the shocks, output might become non-stationary (as in
Sutherland, 1993), thus making it difficult to rationalise stabilisation policy with a band.' The
point is that stabilisation via a credible band on the nominal exchange rate only makes sense in a
6 Increased nominal exchange rate indexation ensures more stability in the real exchange rate and the
levels of demand and employment, but on the other hand it amplifies the effects of wage disturbances on
prices. Alogoskoufis (1991) extends Dombusch (1982) by highlighting the effects of monetary accommo-
dation and exchange ra[e accommodation on the forward-looking behaviour ofwage-setters and price-setters,
and suggests that the higher degree of persistence in inftatioo arises from a higher degree of accommodatioo
in floating exchange rate regimes. In our mociel, the PPP exchange rate rule corresponds to 10096 monetary
sccommodation of price and wsge shocks.
' Of course, in 'traditional' exchange rate band models, ooe can introduce mean-reversioo exogenously
by simply edopting a mean reverting component in the shocks to the economy. However, we thinlc that this
is less appealing than having endogenous mean reversioo based on wagelprice sluggishness.4
stationary stochastic environment (unless one allows for a crawling peg as a putential instrument
for macroeconomic stabilisation). Allowing for (intramarginal) monetary accommodation, enables
us to make a more consistent comparison between a band regime and an unrestricted dirty float.
Sutherland (1993) only compares a band against two special cases, namely a free float and a peg.
Section 2 presents our model of a small open economy. Section 3 discusses the regimes of
maaaged exchange rates without a band, paying paRicular attention to a peg, a clean float, a PPP
rule and a nominal income target. A peg is the best regime for money demand shocks, while a
ttominal income target target is optimal for goods demand shocks. With supply shocks the optimal
degree of monetary acwmmodation rises with the weight attached to output stability rather than to
price stability. Section 4 studies the stability of outputlemployment and prices for different degrees
of intramarginal intervention and various bandwidths under a variety of shocks. Section 4 also
investigates stabilisation policy under an exchange rate band and addresses whether a band is
desirable from a stabilisation perspective. Section 5 concludes.
2 Transitory Unemploym~tt in a Small Open Economy
Most models of exchange rate bands are based on the seminal work of Krugman (1991),
and adopt the unrealistic assumptions of fully flexible wages and prices, and, therefore,
purchasing power parity and full employment. However, for policy purposes it is essential to
allow for sticky nominal wages and transitory unemployment. Otherwise, it would be difficult to
make a case for monetary accommodation or to provide a rationale for exchange rate bands. It is
also impotYant to allow for imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, so that one
can allow for the effects of the real exchange rate on aggregate demand.' Miller and Weller
(1991) therefore apply the analysis of Krugman (1991) to the familiar exchange rate overshooting
model of Dornbusch (1976). In order to study the case of an exchange rate band against other
exchange rate regimes, we extend Miller and Weller (1991) by allowing for a variety of demand
and supply shocks and also for intramarginal interventions9. We assume that the only available
policy insttvment is the money supply, but it is straightforward to introduce fiscal policy (see
Appendix 1). However, monetary policy seems a more realistic instrument for the day-to~ay
management of the exchange rate, while the effects of fiscal policy only become visible with some
lag in time. Thus, our model reads as follows:
' In addition, it is possible to explain the stylised fact that a reduction in nominal ezchange rate
variability goes together with a fall in real exchange rate variability (e.g., Mussa, 1986).
' Lewis (1990) and Lindberg and Sbderlind (1992) also allow for intramarginal interventions.5
y--n(i-tr)fb(etp'-p)fv,nlO,Oebe1 (1)
m- p- y- i` í f w, l`~ 0 (2)
dp - eqP(y - y~ dt f~r dt f a~dz,, dzP - IN(O,dt), ~~~ 0 (3)
E,(de) - (1 - t7 dt (4)
dv --tp,vdt f a„dz,., dz„ - IN(O,dt), m,.~0 (Sa)
dw --~Wwdt f a„àz,,, dz,,, - IN(O,dt), ~,.~0 (Sb)
where m, y, yF, p, p', e, l, i and x denote the logazithms of nominal money supply, aggregate
demand, full-employment level uf output, home price level, foreign price level, nominal exchange
rate (the price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency units), domestic
interest rate, foreign interest rate and core inflation, respectively. Furtttermore, dzr, dz,,, and dz,,.
denote shocks to supply, demand for domestic goods and money demand, respectively. These
shocks are independent of each other.
The IS-curve (1) says that aggregate demand increases when the real interest rate declines
or the real exchange rate depreciates. The real interest rate is simply [he nominal interest rate
minus core inFlation. Variable v is the accumulation of shocks to the demand for domestically
produced goods and follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Sa) with mean-reversion parameter
~, and instantaneous standard deviation a,. (e.g. Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p.172). The LM-curve
(2) says that the velocity of circulation increases with the nominal interest rate. Vaziable w is the
accumulation of velocity shocks and follows the process (Sb). The Phillips-curve (3) indicates that
inflation occurs if there is a shortage of labour, and that deflation occurs when there is
unemployment. The degree of labour mazket flexibility is determined by the pazameter ~o. Supply
shocks z, follow a Brownian motion and represent positive shocks to nominal wages. Producer
prices are a constant mark-up on unit labour costs, so that supply shocks may also be interpreted
as negative shocks to labour productivity. The money supply is stable in steady state, so core
inflation a being the expected steady-state rate of inflation is assumed to be zero.'o The
uncovered interest pazity condition (4) says that an interest rate differential in favour of the
domestic country can only be sustained if the currency is expected to depreciate in the future, i.e.
if the currency is currently over-valued.
Shocks to the foreign price level correspond to shocks to domestic demand (v-bp~, so
'" This implirs that the economy is always saddlepath stable. If aggregate demand depends, in contrast,
on the real consumption interest rate, i.e. the aominal interest rate minus the rationally expacted change in
the price level, an unstable spiral may result for higher inflation depresses the real interest nate, boosts
aggregate demand and thus induces even higher inFlation. The use of core ioflation in the definition of the
real interest rate avoids such a spiral and simplifies the algebra.6
that without loss of generality we set p'-0. Furthermore, shocks to the foreign interest rate
correspond to a combination of goods and money demand shocks and we thus set ï-0. We also
normalise full~mployment output to unity, so that yF-O. The dynamics aze thus given by
dp -~o(ntóT,) rdoa -~o~l mó~ p
dv 1 0 -~,(n.a) 0 0 v
dt . dw ~ r1t~ 0 0 -~w(nt~) fl w











where output follows from the reduced-form IS-LM model
Y-(nf~)-'I-(n-~ó1`)p f 1`v t n(m-w) t ó),el, (~)
and the interest rate follows from idt-iide. Adverse supply shocks (higher p) cause stagflation,
while adverse demand shocks (lower v, m or e and higher w) cause unemployment and deflation.
3 Managed Exchange Rates without a Band
3.1 Composite fundamental andthe reducedform
Exchange rate regimes can be characterised by money supply rules which react to
fundamentals. The latter are a time-invariant function of the predetermined part of the state
vector. If we impose ~, -~~ ~~ and ~„ -~S on the mean reversion parameters, the money
supply rule and the fundamental aze given by:"
m - p f ~(f-p) with f~ p t(1~)''(vfw). (8)
where ~ is the long-run component of the money supply, f denotes the fundamental and ~ stands
" Iff depends on any other linear combination of p, v and w, the ezchange rate cennot be uniquely
delermined from the fundamental alone, but depends al.so on the values of the individual components of the
fundamental.~
for the coefficient of monetary accommodation. Monetary policy can be conducted in this way if,
for example, the central bank has more information than private agents. lf the private sector does
not observe shocks to the individual stochastic components of the fundamental itself, the private
sector can from the money supply rule (8) unambiguously infer the change in the fundamental and
thus the way in which the exchange rate should go (given intervention policy and excluding
bubbles). However, if authorities respond to individual shocks in a way which does not
correspond to (8), the private sector cannot infer how the exchange rate is supposed to change
from observing a given change in the money supply for it does not ktww the type of shock that






dt .~}~ I~i I(1-Q)w dt t ~a0 I(6~)
where
Q ~ áo t (a: ~ o:.)~(1-b)~ .
The transient certainty-equivalent rational expectations response of this reduced form to an
unanticipated permanent increase in the long-run component of the money supply ~ is presented in
Figure I, both for a low and a high coefficient of monetary accommodation.
3.2 Rationa! expecrations and short-run dynamics
The fundamental is predetermined, whilst the exchange rate is a non-predetermined,
forwazd-looking variable. The rational expectations equilibrium must thus be a saddlepath
solution. 'Iitis requires one eigenvalue with a negative real part and one eigenvalue with a positive
real part, which is ensured as long as ~L I. It can be shown that the economy has a faster speed
of adjustment (i.e. the modulus of the eigenvalue with the negative real part is higher) if there is
more mean reversion in the stochastic processes for prices and shocks to goods and money
demand and also if the coefficient of monetary accommodation falls. The non-explosive rational
expectations solution is:
e-W-w(Ï-u) with w. ó(1{m~)t~n(1-~)- [á(Ittb~)t~n(1-ly)1'.4~á1`(1-Q-ó) (9)
f 2má1,
7i~e slope of the saddlepath increases (w) if the degree of monetary accommodation ~ increases.
For low degrees of monetary accommodation, i.e. ~c 1-á, there is a negative correlation between
the nominal exchange rate and the fundamental, i.e. the saddlepath has a negative slope (wt0).
This implies that the nominal exchange rate overshoots in response to an unanticipated and8
permanent change in the long-run money supply ~(cf. Dornbusch, 1976). For high degrees of
monetary accommodation, 1-óG~G 1, the saddlepath slopes upwards (~~0), which implies
undershewting of the nominal exchange rete. The turning point between overshcxHing end
undershcwting of the nominal exchange rate in response to an unanticipated permanent change in
the money supply corresponds to a degree of monetary accommodation that ensures a fixed
nominal exchange rate (i.e. {9-1-ó), so that e-p and m-0. This nominal exchange rate regime
will be referred to as a peg. The relationship between ~ and ~ pivots azound the 'pegpoint'
({4-1-ó) towazds the horizontal axis as ~ increases. For a classical model with full employment
(i.e. ~~), w-~0 and all transitional dynamics disappear. The steady state corresponds to the
mean of the asymptotic distributions and is independent of the monetary accommodation
coefficient S. In the long run relative purchasing power parity holds and money is neutral.
The (certainty-equivalent) full-employment Iocus requires a stable fundamental (df-o) and
is steeper than 45", because its slope (i.e. I trl(1-~)l~ó) is greater than unity. A one per cent
increase in the fundamental reduces aggregate demand through an appreciation of the real
exchange rate and through a wntraction of real money balances, hence to ensure full employment
the nominal exchange rate must depreciate by more than one percent. The effect on real money
balances is less if the mon~ary accommodation coefficient is high, so that as S increases the full-
employment locus becomes flatter and tilts towards the 45" line.
The interest pazity locus requires that the market expects a stable exchange rate (E,de-O).
An inerease in the fundamental corresponds on the one hand to a monetary contraction and thus an
increase in the interest rate, le,es so if there is a high degree of monetary accommodation, and on
the other hand to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a fall in aggregate demand and a fall
in the interest rate. The latter (former) effect is more likely to dominate if ~ is high (low), in
which case a depreciation (appreciation) of the nominal exchange rate is required to push up
(depress) the interest rate back to the foreign rate. More precisely, the slope of the interest parity
locus (i.e. -(t-~-ó)ló) is negative for low degrees of monetary accommodation (~G 1-ó), whilst it
is positive and less than unity for high degrees of monetary accommodation (1-óG~G 1).
An unanticipated increase in the long-run component of the money supply W causes
overshooting of the nominal exchange rate for low degrees of accommodation (~G 1-ó) (cf.
Dornbusch, 1976) - see Figure 1(a). The market expects an interest rate differential in favour of
the rest of the world and thus over time a gradually appreciating exchange rate, so that the
exchange rate must on impact over-react. However, for large coefficients of monetary
accommodation (1-óG~G 1), the exchange rate undershoots on impact - see Figure 1(b). A
gradual increase in prices is accompanied by a gradual expansion of the money supply, so that the9
anticipated gradual rise in interest rates is less pronounced. Consequently, the exchange rate
depreciates less and the interest rate falls less on impact, thereby leading to undershooting rather
than overshooting of the nominal exchange rate.
3.3 Specia! cases: Peg, cltan Jloat, PPPexchange rate rule and NIT
Under a peg the monetary authorities use unsterilised interventions to fix the nominal
exchange rate. lf the foreign interest rate exceeds the domestic interest rate, there is an incipient
capital outflow and pressure on the currency to depreciate. Under a peg, the central bank defends
the exchange rate by selling foreign reserves and buying its own currency. As a result, the money
supply falls until the domestic interest rate is pushed up to the level of the foreign interest rate.
Hence, a peg corresponding to e-eP implies that the domestic interest rate is anchored to the
foreign interest rate, and that an independent domestic monetary policy is infeasible. A peg
corcesponds to a specific money supply rule, namely m-(1-á~tóeP. Hence, a peg implies an
accommodation coefficient of (i-1-ó and a long-run component of the money supply of p-eP.12
under a peg the fundamental follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process of the form df--
~b(~-eP~ttodz. The asymptotic mean and variance of this process are mean(n-p-er and
var(~-'ha2l~ó.
Other special cases are zero monetary accommodation (~4-0), which we refer to as a
clean Jloat and always implies exchange rate overshooting, and, at the other extreme, ful!
accommodation (~-1, m ~. The mnemonics for these cases aze FLOAT and FA, respeaively.
Under a clean float the monetary authorities neither give in to changes in wages and prices, nor to
changes in the demand for domestic goods or money and thus keep the nominal money supply
fixed in the face of shocks. However, full accommodation implies that all shocks to the
fundamental are accommodated. If pyl, the saddlepath solution tilts towards the 45'-line, e-f,
the domestic interest rate is pegged to the foreign interest rate, and the nominal price level and
exchange rate, as well as the fundamental, become non-stationary (var(p), var(e), var(J}-~oo). The
degree of accommodation needed to target the real exchange rate, i.e. a PPP exchange rate rule,
depends on the source of the shocks. If there are only supply shocks, full accommodation
corresponds to a PPP rule in which the real exchange rate is targeted (cf. Dornbusch, 1982).
However, if there aze only money demand shocks a PPP rule corresponds to ~- l-ó, i.e. to
pegging the nominal exchange rate.
" In general, we have p-ePtp'-r(nta)lb so that a lower foreiga price level and a higher foreign
interest rate require a more restrictive monetary policy in order to defend the value of the currency u a
given rate t~.lo
Hence, a peg, a clean tloat and a PPP rule correspund to targets fur, respectively, the
nominal exchange rate (or the nominal interest rate), the nominal money supply and the real
exchange rate. An alternative is to target nominal income, say ytp-nP, which we call a NIT
(e.g. Bean, 1983; Alogoskout"is, 1989). If shocks [o goods demand, money demand and aggregate
supply are observable, a NIT can be attained with a money supply rule of the form
m-n;~ifw-(1-~)(nPtw)t~f." A NIT thus requires a coefficient of monetary accommodation
equal to ~-~, where i4 is implicitly defined by the equation )`(1 tá(w-1)trii4-0. Examination uf
the expression for w in (9) shows that a NIT implies leaning against the wind, i.e. S-~cO.
Hence, the lower the price level, the bigger the adverse shock to the demand for goods and the
higher the targeted level of nominal income, the looser the supply of money under a NIT. If the
semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate is zero (1,-0), a NIT
corresponds to a free float (i.e. ~-0). In that case, attaining a NIT corresponds to setting the
money supply to the desired NIT plus the shock to money demand. We refer to the class of
regimes without a band (excluding a PEG, FLOAT or FA) as an unrestricted dirty float, i.e. an
UDF."
3.4 Stabilisation policy in an uncertain environmenr
Substituting (9) into (6), we obtain the dynamics of the price level:
[~~(w-1)}0r1(Ig- t)1(1-b) (P-F~) t[~a(1 tó(w -1))t~nl~lv t[~á)`w tdn(igtá-1)] wl
dP - (1-b) (Ot~) 1
f o, dz,.
With the aid of (]0), (tí) and (7), we calculate the asymptotic variances and covariances:
vaz(p) -(2~)-' [k~(~) a,2 f kx(~) o,Z t k~(Q) Q.~1,
var(y) -(2~)-' [Q,2 t kz(R) a~Z t ók~(~) aW21ik~(Q),




~t), ~~) ~ [~(1 tó(w-1))tnRl` ,
~I(1-t3)tó~(1-w) ( I-ó)Z~J~(t,ó(I-w))'n(Z-R)1[á),(1-w).~(1-13)1
" Note that the information requirement for attaining a NIT is somewhat stronger than for the
rules; in the former case both authorities and private agents should be able to observe realisations
of money demand shocks separately.
" Boyer (1978), Roper and Tumovsky (1980), and Tumovsky (1983) diacuss the merits of exchange
rate interv~tion policy under an UDF.11
~~) ~ ~ [óa~,tn(~tó-1)]z .
ó(l -ó) [a1,(1-m)tn(l -B)][b~(2 -m)~n(t .ó-R)1
It can readily be verified that k,' 10; kZ' G 0 for ~ G~ and k2' 10 for 11 ~~~, where ~ G 0 is
implicitly defined by )`(lfó(~-1))fn14-0. Also, we establish that k,'GO for ~G 1-à and k,'10
for 1-b G,B G 1, 8(k,lk,)!a~ G 0 for ~ G~ and a(k2lk,)18~ ~ 0 for 1~~1{4, and 8(k,lk,)la~ G 0 for
~G 1-ó and 8(k,lk,)I8~~0 for 1-óG~G 1.
To highlight the effects on vaziances of different degrees of monetary accommodation for
various shocks, Table 1 makes use of (11) to tabulate var(p) and var(y) for a number of special
values of ~. Note that the variances of output and the price level under a peg, nominal income
target or full accommodation do not depend on the semi-elasticities of goods and money demand
with respect to the interest rate (i.e. n and a). The expected speed of inean reversion towazds the
steady state increases and thus the variances of output and the price level decrease with the degree
of labour market flexibility (tb).
Proposition 1: Optimal stabilisation without a band
(a) If there are only goods demand shocks, imposing a NIT (i.e. ~-~GO) stabilises both output
and the price level (i.e. var(y)-var(p)-0).
(b) If there are only money demand shocks, a peg (i.e. ~-1-ó) stabilises both output and the price
level.
(c) If there are only supply shocks, the variance of output decreases while the variance of the
price level increases in the coefficient of monetary accommodation ~. Full accommodation
stabilises output, while the variance of the price level tends to zero as the authorities lean more
and more against the wind (i.e. if ~-~-oo). The asymptotic trade-off between the variance of
output and the variance of the price level is convex. Hence, the optimal coefficient of tnonetary
accommodation increases if the authorities attach relatively more weight to the vaziance of output
rather than to the variance of the price level.
A boost to the demand for goods (e.g., an increase in world trade) puts upwazd pressure
on the price level, thereby depressing real money balances, raising the nominal interest rate and
partly choking off the excess demand for goods. Increasing the money supply in response to this
shock mitigates the effect on the interest rate, which stimulates the demand for goods and fuels
intlation. Hence, a better policy for the central bank is to contract the money supply in response
to an exogenous boost to demand. However, if the authorities lean too much against the wind (i.e.
14G14), the contraction of demand induced by the tighter monetary policy more than offsets the12
exogertous boost to demand, so that a deflationary recession results. Hence, too much leaning
against the wind also destabilises the economy. In fact, the optimal value of the monetary
accommodation coefficient in response to goods demand shocks is the one that corresponds to a
NIT.u.~"
Shocks to the demand for money can exactly be offset by compensating changes in the
rttoney supply (i.e. I4-1-ó). This corresponds to a target for the nominal exchange rate.
Exogenous increases in the nominal wage rate or in oil prices (supply shocks) induce higher prices
and thus less demand for goods (stagflation). Accommodation of such shocks depresses the
interest rate, which mitigates the effects on aggregate demand and employment at the expense of
higher inflation. Hence, in a situation of supply shocks, it is optimal to have a lot of monetary
accommodation if the vaziance of the output is judged to be relatively much more important than
the variance of the price level.
In practice, the central bank may want to impose a money supply rule to stabilise output,
but may have no clear idea (for example, because the collection of macroeconomic data is poor)
which is the dominant source of shocks hitting the economy. It would then be desirable to
implement a rule which is robust against various types of shocks.
Proposition 2: Robustness
(a) If shocks hit only goods demand, a peg (i.e. the optimal exchange rate regime in a situation uf
only money demand shocks) yields a lower variance of output than full accommodation (which
ensures a zero variance of output if there are only supply shocks).
(b) lf shocks only impact money demand and á 2 113, the vptimal rule against goods demand
shocks (~-~ c 0) yields a lower variance of output than full accommodation.
(c) If there are only supply shocks, a peg yields a lower variance of output than the optimal rule
against goods demand shocks. Hence, targeting the nominal exchange rate is preferred to targeting
nominal income.
(d) Let the welfare loss function be given by var(y)fyvar(p) (y20). Suppose that the individual
source of shocks cannot be observed. However, the authorities have a Flat prior abvut the true
13 One disadvantage of a NIT might be that nominal income data are much less precise and appear with
a longer lag than money supply, interest rate or exchange rate data.
" The optimal pnlicy under gocxfs demand shocks is a NIT, which correspcmds to leaning against the
wind. Sutherland's (1993) model reJuces W our mudel if lahour markets are fully flexible (i.e. 0oyoo and
t1-tr-Yr-ao~~,-m„-0). [n that case, a frce float is the optimal stabilis~ation policy under goods demand
shocks. The difference arises from our assumption that ~,10, which is required for stationarity and thus for
the existence of variancas of output and prices in our malel.l3
type of shock and know that the instantaneous variances of the three types of shocks are equal."
If the central bank attaches relatively high weight to output stabilisation (i.e. y G ó), a peg is
preferred to full accommodation or a NIT. However, if the central bank attaches relatively high
weight to price stabilisation (i.e. y~ó), a NIT is preferred to a peg or full accommodation."
In (a) and (c), a peg is preferred, because the corresponding degree of monetary
accommodation (~-1-ó) is closer to what is optimal under the ttve shock type. If the sensitivity of
the demand for home goods foc the real exchange rate increases (i.e. ó increases), the degree of
accommodation that pegs the exchange rate moves in the direction of the degree of
accommodation ~ that insulates output from goods demand shocks (case (b)). Part (d) says that a
peg is a relatively safe intermediate position if authorities lack full information about the shocks
and care a lot about output stabilisation." Of course, if 05 y tó, a peg is not the optimal
regime; it is only better than a NIT and full accommodation. Similarly, if y~ó, a NIT is not the
optimal regime. lf the prior of goods demand shocks (being the true type of shock) increases or if
the variance of goods demand shocks increases relative to the other variances, imposing a NIT
becomes relatively more attractive. It is remarkable that for none of the three shocks a elean float
is optimal. However, if the authorities are not sure whether shocks occur in money demand or in
goods demand, a clean float may have some virtue.
If there is only one type of shock, the authorities can fully stabilise output by an
appropriate choice of the coefficient of monetary accommodation. If there is a combination of
different types of shocks, this is not possible anymore due to a lack of policy instruments. In
many cases there is a trade-off between the insulation from one type of shock against the
insulation of output andlor the price level from another type of shock. In the following, we
assume that the welfare loss function of the policy maker is given by var(y)tyvar(p) with y20.
Proposition 3: Stabilisation with multiple source of shocks
(a) If there are both goods demand and money demand shocks, the central banker chooses a
relatively tight degree of accommodation or a policy of leaning against the wind (i.e., a~ between
" Alternatively, the centrel bank doea not know the instantaneous variance of eacó shack, but it attaches
the same prior distribution to each of these variances.
'r For a slightly different setting where authorities know the instantaneous variance of the
fundamental for some reason, one can show that the results are exactly the same.
" A formal proof of (d) is obtained by taking for R-~, ~-1-á snd (i3l the unconditiooal tneaa (with
respect to the prior distribution) of var(y) and comparing the resulting expressions.14
~ and 1-b).
(b) lf there are both goods demand and supply shocks, a policymaker who cares only about output
stability (y very small) chooses an accommodation coefficient between ~GO and 1. In contrast, a
policymaker who is only concerned about price stability (y very lazge), will choose a policy of
much more severe leaning against the wind (i.e. ~G~cO).
(c) If there are money demand and supply shocks, a policymaker who cares only about the
stability of output chooses a high degree of monetary accommodation (i.e. 1-bc~C 1). On the
other hand, if the central bank only cares about the stability of the price level, a tighter degree of
accommodation is chosen (i.e. ~G 1-b).
In part (a), authorities obtain stabilisation gains with respect to both sources of shocks by
increasing the degree of accommodation if ~G~ and by decreasing it if 1-bG~G L Since a,10
and a,~0, the optimal degree of accommodation lies strictly between ~ and 1-b, and not at the
boundaries of this range. The reason is that, if the optimal degree of accommodation was ~, then
by slightly increasing ~, there is secondorder stabilisation [oss from the presence of goods
demand shocks, but a first-order stabilisation gain from the presence of money demand shocks. A
similar reasoning can be applied to parts (b) and (c).
J.S Labour marketflexibility
If the labour market clears immediately, all variances and covariances go to zero. Hence,
the degree of monetary accummodation becomes irrelevant, as long as there is not full
accommodation, and the choice of exchange rate regime does not matter either. In practice, the
labour market does not clear immediately and it is of interest to investigate how a policy to
improve labour market flexibility affects the optimal degree of monetary accommodation. If there
are only money demand shocks, a peg is the best exchange rate regime. The corresponding
coefficient of monetary accommodation is independent of the degree of labour market flexibility
(~4-1-b). However, if there are only goods demand shocks, a NIT is the best policy. It can be
shown that the corresponding coefficient of monetary accommodation declines with the degree of
labour market flezibility (i.e. ~ falls if ~ rises). If there are only supply shocks, a more flexible
labour market induces the authorities to shift the optimal degree of monetary accommodation away
from the pegpoint, i.e. authorities who originally chose pc 1-b further decrease their
accommodation wef"ticient, while authorities who originally chose I-SG~G 1 further increase
their degree of accommodation. The reason is that the ratio var(p)Ivar(y) increases in ~ if I4C l-ó
and decreases in ~ if 1-óe~c 1. Hence, more conservative central bankers view a more flexible15
labour market as a reason to tighten the response of the money supply to shocks, while the
opposite is the case for more left-wing central bankers.
4 Stabilisation and lntramarginal Intervention under an Exchange Rate Band
4.1 Restricted dirtyjloat.~ A band on the exchange rtue
With an exchange rate band, we postulate a twice differentiable function for the
saddlepath:
e - w - n U-t~). (9')
Use of Ito's Lemma, df2 - Q' (df-dp) t'h o~ il" dt, yields a second~rder nonlinear differential
equation:
'~ az o"U-~) t m(vt~T' {-[a~},~(1-~)] U-w) } aa oU-~)} n'U-~) -
(nfar' [U-a-s) (tt~) t a nUw)] - o. (12)
This equation yields a time-invariant relationship between the nominal exchange rate and
fundamental. Note that there are only two linear solutions corresponding to the stable and unstable
azms of the saddlepath solution of the unrestricted dirty Float (see section 3.2). These Iinear
solutions are, of course, not compatible with a band on the nominal exchange rate.
The solution for the exchange rate in the band depends on the nature of the interventions
undertaken by the monetary authorities if the exchange rate reaches the boundaries of its band.
The band on the nominat exchange rate consists of an upper bound (e") and a lower bound (eJ.
The authorities ensure that the exchange rate does not move outside this band by imposing
thresholds f~~tfT'(e"-~) and j,,.pfQ'(e,;~) on the fundamental. We focus only on exchange
rate solutions that are symmetric about the origin by normalising the central parity to zero (i.e.
p-0). Hence, f - j~ and e"--e,,~0. If the fundamental is between f" and f,,, the exchange rate
is inside its band and the coefficient of intramarginal monetary accommodation is ~, while,
beyond these thresholds, the coefficient of inframarginal accommodation corresponds to the one
that is needed to keep the exchange rate fixed at the upper, respectively, lower boundary of the
band (i.e. 1-a). The money supply rule which supports this policy is given by the piecewise-linear16
tvle:~
m-)Sf, forf"GfGfr if~G 1-ó andf,,GfGfif I-bG~G 1, .
m- (1-by f óec, forfZfc if ~G 1-b andfsfc if 1-óG~G 1, (8')
m-(1-b)J' t be", forfsfif )4G 1-ó and f Zfif 1-áG~G 1.
Note that (8') makes use of Q' G 0 for ~ G 1-b, and R' 10 for 1-ó G~G 1, which correspond to an
inverted and regular S-shaped solution of ft(.), respectively. The switch points f~fJ-'(e") and
f~riQ'(eJ follow implicitly from the smooth pasting conditions, which are the appropriate
boundary conditions (cf. Miller and Weller, 1991)Z'. If the fundamental crosses f(or f~) from
the interior of its bartd, the nominal interest rate differential, i.e. i-i, jumps from a negative
(positive) value to zero. Hence, the monetary authorities have to implement a discrete contraction
(expansion) of the nominal tnoney supply in order to raise (depress) the interest rate and prevent
the exchange rate from moving outside its band. Because the market anticipates this regime switch
at the boundaries of the band, the exchange rate solution bends and becomes horizontal as the
economy approaches the boundaries. 71tis is called the "honeymoon effect".
Beetsma and Van der Ploeg ( 1993) discuss in detail the dependence of the exchange rate
solution on the coefficient of intramarginal monetary accommodation. For )4G 1-á, the upper
bound e~ translates into a lower bound on the fundamental, fG 0, which decreases towards minus
infinity as ~ approaches the value corresponding to a peg ()Sf 1-ó), while for l-óG14G 1, the upper
bound e" translates into an upper bound on the fundamental, f" ~ 0, which decreases from plus
infinity as {i approaches unity. Figure 2(a) portrays exchange rate solutions for a given bandwidth
under various degrees of intramarginal intervention, while Figure 2(b) does the same for the
implicit bands on the fundamental.
p This specification does not allow intramarginal interventions to depend on how close the exchange
rate is to the edges of the band. This would complicate the solution without changing the quslitative features
of the analysis very much.
" Although it is not possible to obtain a closed-form expre.csion for tl(.), one can characterise the
solution qualitatively (cf. Miller and Weller, 1989). 7i~ere is a unique solution in the band which fulfills the
smooth pasting conditions (for I~GRG 1 this is guarante~l if ~~51). For R G 1-b the solution is downward
sloping and for 1-deRGl it is upward sloping. It is strictly concave in the upper half of the band, snd
strictly convez in the lower half of the band.17
4.2 Variances ofoutput and the price levei under a óand
Because an exchange rate band makes the model nonlinear, a solution is not available in
closed form and distributions of macroeconomic variables are unknown. Hence, we resort to
Monte Cazlo simulations in order to study the effects of a band on variances of macroeconomic
outcomes (srx Appendix 2). Since the optimal intramarginal coefficient of monetary
accommodation is invariant to propurtional changes in e~ and o, we only consider ehanges in
bandwidth as these have the opposite effect of changes in the standard deviation of the
fundamental.
Most of the time the exchange rate is inside the band, where intramarginal monetaty
accommodation (intervention) takes place with accommodation coefficient ~, and the remainder of
the time the exchange rate is held fixed at the boundaries. Hence, var(y) and var(p) under a band
are approximately a weighted average of corresponding variances under an unrestricted dirty float
and a fixed exchange rate. Whether vaziances under a band are closer to variances under an
unrestricted dirty float or under a peg, depends on the amount of time the exchange rate spends
inside the band relative to the amount of time it spends on the edges of the band. This fraction of
time depends on three factors: the speed of inean reversion, the shape of the exchange rate
solution (in particular, its steepness in absolute terms) and the wídth of the band. A higher degree
of inean reversion induces vaziances under a band to behave more like under an unrestricted dirty
float. The steeper the exchange rate solution, for a given degree of inean reversion and
bandwidth, the more variances under a band behave like under a peg. Finally, a wider band also
reduces the relative amount of time spent on the edges, ceteris paribus, thereby making variances
behave more like under an unrestricted dirty float.
An increase in labour market flexibility (rb) flattens the saddlepath (cf. section 3.2).
Hence, with a band on the nominal exchange rate, the implied gap between the thresholds on the
fundamental, beyond which the exchange rate is held on the boundaries of its band, increases. A
higher variance of the fundamental (a~ and a higher value of the semi-elasticity of the demand for
money with respect to the interest rate (J~) induce a stronger honeymoon effect on the exchange
rate solution, i.e. the solution for the nominal exchange rate flattens. A higher vaziance shortens
the expected time towards stabilisation of the exchange rate at its boundaries. The prospect of
future stabilisation strengthens the exchange rate now if it is in the upper half of its band, and
weakens the exchange rate if it is in the lower half of the band. Similarly, a higher ), adds to the
forward-looking character of the solution and increases the response of the current spot exchange
rate to changes in the expected rate of change in the future (cf. Krugman, 1991). Hence, the
imminent stabilisation at the boundaries of the band has a stronger stabilising effetx on theI8
exchange rate now. Summarising, via their effect on the exchange rate solution, a higher aZ, a
higher ), and a higher ~ shift variances under a band in the direction of their wunterparts under
an unrestricted dirty float. However, these parameter changes also affect the degree of inean
reversion. A higher variance leads to relatively more time heing spent at the edges of the band,
counteracting its etfect via the exchange rate stilutiun. Huwever, a higher ~ increases the degree
of inean reversion (Beetsma and van der Ploeg, 1993), thus strengthening the effect of an increase
in ~ through the shape of the exchange rate solution.
How does the degree of intramarginal intervention affect the variances of output and the
príce level under various bandwidths? Figure 3 depicts var(y) under, respectively, goods demand,
money demand and supply shocks, for varying coefficients of iniramarginal accommodation and a
number of bandwidths (including an unrestricted dirty float). Figure 3 also graphs var(p) under
supply shocks.-~ The simulations assume t)-a-b-eti-0.5, a,-0.0125, aW-0.0125 and
a~-0.05. The instantaneous standard deviations have been chosen to ensure that they yield the
same instanteneous standard deviation for the fundamental, a. Hence, for given ~, the solution of
the exchange rate as a function of the fundamental is the same for each type of shock. Figure 3
confirms that, for a given coefficient of intramarginal intervention in the range ~5~G1, the
variance under a band lies between the variance under an unrestricted dirty tloat and the variance
under a peg.
Proposition 4~ Variances under various handwidthc
(a) If there are only gc~ods demand shocks, the variances of output and the price level under a
band exceed (are le.cs than) the corre.eponding variances under an unrestricted dirty float for small
(large) cuefticients uf intramarginal aceummuJatiun, i.e. tiir SSSG I-ó (i.e. tiir I-SGRc I). In
fact, the variances of output and the price level decline (rise) with the bandwidth for relatively
small (large) intramarginal accommodation coefficients.
(b) If there are only money demand shocks, the variances of output and the price level increase
with the bandwidth for aIl coefticients of intramarginal monetary accommodation (except ~- I-b).
Hence, the introduction of a band reduces the variances of output and the price level.
(c) If there are only supply shocks, for relatively low coefficients of intramarginal monetary
accommexlation, i.e. SG 1-ó, var(y) is smaller and var(p) is larger, the narrower the band.
However, for I-bGSG 1, var(y) rises and var(,i) falls a.e the band narrows. Clearly, an
unrestricted dirty tloat is desirable tix uutput (price) stability if the coefticient uf intramarginal
~ The behaviour of var(p) under goods demand and naney demand shocks is qualitatively Ihe same as
that of var(y), so for sake of brevity we have not plotted var(p).19
accommodation coefticient is relatively high (small).
Figure 3 also indicates that, with goods demand shocks, a given bandwidth yields a better
performance (in terms of outputlemploymen[ stability) than an unrestricted dirty float for relatively
high coefficients of intramarginal intervention (i.e. 1-bt~~ 1). With money demand shocks, a
band always performs better than an unrestricted dirty float. With supply shocks, a band improves
performance in terms of output stability at the expense of price stability if the coefï'icient of
intramarginal monetary acwmmodation is small (i.e. ~c 1-b), and vice versa if S is lazge (i.e. 1-
b~14~ 1).
4.3 Second-bestforeign exchange marketintervention
A standard result in the literature (e.g. Davis 1977, Chapters 5 and 6) states that with a
quadratic objective function and a linear dynamic model, a linear control rule will be optimal. As
an exchange rate band corresponds to a piece-wise linear money supply rule, a band cannot (in the
absence of speculative bubbles) outperform an unrestricted dirty float. Hence, in a first-best
situation, a central bank does not wish to restrict the use of the money supply instrument, and thus
an exchange rate band is not advisable. However, in practice many countries do maintain a band
on the exchange rate, the most notable example being the member countries of the European
Monetary System (EMS). These bands are probably not installed to ensure better macroeconomic
stabilisation, but for political reasons or credibility purposes. The latter is often suggested to be a
major motivation for tying onès currency to the D-mark (e.g., see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988) or
for having a band on the exchange rate (e.g., Svensson, 1992b; Cukierman, Kiguel and
Leiderman, 1993). We take the presence of an exchange rate band as given and investigate how a
band affects welfare losses.
Pronosition 5: Welfare losses under a band
(a) If there are only money demand shocks, establishing an exchange rate band does not induce
welfare losses. Also, the optimal degree of intramarginal intervention under a band is the same as
under an unrestricted dirty float.
(b) If there are only goods demand shocks or supply shocks, an exchange rate band generally
induces welfare losses. Relative (to an unrestricted dirty float) welfare losses under a band aze
lazger if the band is narrower and the instantaneous variance of the exogenous shocks is higher.
With money demand shocks a band does not lead to welfare losses, since the central bank20
simply k~ps the exchange rate at the central parity. Fur the other twu lypes uf shocks, a
narrower band or a higher variance makes a band relatively more harmful. With goods demand
and supply shocks, a band forces monetary authorities to switch to sub-0ptimal foreign exchange
market intervention from time to time in order to defend the band. This induces a change in the
degree of monetary acwmrrxtdation inside the band away from what would have been optimal
under a UDF. In a sense, there is a trade~iff between sub-optimal intramarginal intervention and
sub-optimal inframarginal intervention. Both the direction and the size of the bias in the degree of
intramarginal intervention depend on how much wurse a peg is compared to the optimal degree of
monetary accommtxlation under a UDF and on how the fractiun of time spent in either regime is
affected. In general, shifting the degree uf intremarginal accommtalatiun away from the 'pegpoint'
(~- 1-ó) implies a stronger honeymoon ettect and thus a lerger part of [he time being spent inside
the band. At the same time, a shift in the degree of intramarginal intervention changes the degree
of inean reversion of the exchange rate. Stronger mean reversion implies that the exchange rate
spends a larger fraction of its time inside the band.
Another second-best case arises if the central bank bank is restricted to a given, for
example zero, degree of intramarginal intervention. Is it then desirable to join an exchange rate
arrangement which imposes a band on the exchange rate?~
Prqposition 6: De.eirability of a hand for a given degree of intramareinal intervention~
(a) If there are only goods demand shocks, introducing a band induces welfare losses ifSS~G 1-b
and welfare gains if 1-bS~G (.
(b) If there only money demand shocks, an exchange rate bend is desirable for any degree of
intramarginal intervention )4~ 1-á.
(c) If there are only supply shocks, the desirahility uf a band depends on the weight attached to
price stability. For low degrees of intramarginal accommodation (i.e. SG I-i5), a central banker
who places a relatively high weight on price stability (y large) does not want to impose a band,
n This seems contradictory, lxxause a band sometime.e rryuires the central bank to change its degree of
monetary accommodation in ordzr to defend the band. However, one can think of a situation where the
tvles of a multilaterel exchange rate system have priority to national rules. For example, central banks of
EMS participants are obligecl, as part of the arrengement, to intervene if exchange rates are at the edges of
their bands. However, the artangement does not involve any commitment to monetary policy if the
exchange rate is inside the bend.
u A central bank, constrainul by a given (3, may wish to impuse a band that is as narrow as possible
(i.e., a peg). However, such regimes are usually multilateral with a common bandwidth for all bilateral
exchange rate,c (as in the EMS). Hence, the yuestion is whether an authority re.etricted to a given Q wishes
to join such an arrengement with a givzn bandwidth.zl
while a central banker who places relatively little weight on price stability (y small) finds a band
desirable. However, if 1-de~c l, conservative central bankers find a band on the nominal
exchange rate worthwile.
If there are only goods demand shocks, a very countercyclical monetary policy (i.e. S
much less than ~) makes a band worthwile as variances under a UDF inay exceed variances under
a peg. In part (c), by a central bank that places 'relatively high weight' on price stability, we
mean a central banker who would choose a degree of monetary accommodation lower than (1-á)
in absence of a band. Proposition 7 thus suggests that a band is preferred to an unrestricted dirty
float if the given degree of intramarginal intervention is sub-0ptimal compared to ~-1-ó.
5 Concluding remarks
We have analysed macroeconomic stabilisation and foreign exchange mazket interventions
within the context of small open economy. With money demand shocks a pegged exchange rate is
optimal, but with goods demand shocks a nominal income target is best. With supply shocks the
optimal aiefficient of monetary accommodation rises with the relative weight attached to output
rather than price stability. A clean float is seldom optimal. Countries impose exchange rate bands
for various reasons to do with politics and credibility. It is thus interesting to ask whether such a
band is desirable from a stabilisation point of view. In a first-best situation a band is not
advisable, although with money demand shocks no welfare losses are incurred. For goods demand
and supply shocks, a band performs relatively worse the narrower it is and the higher the variance
of the shocks is. In a second-best situation in which a given band is in place, authorities trade off
enhanced use of interventions at the boundaries versus suboptimal intervention policy inside the
band.
In this paper the desirability of exchange rate bands has been studied from a stabilisation
point of view. A direction for future research is to investigate whether a welfaze case for
exchange rate bands can be made on credibility rather than on stabilisation grounds. Such an
analysis trades off the benefits of an exchange rate band in terms of enhanced credibility against
the costs of a potentially reduced scope for stabilisation. Our analysis has been concerned with
stabilising properties of credible exchange rate bands. Hence, a line for further research is to
investigate how macroeconomic stability is affected by imperfect credibility of the band.
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Appendiz t: Fiscal pidicy and rrroníKary aceummudution
Allowing for fiscal policy gives the IS-curve:
y--n (i-r) f b(etPP) f R f ~, n~O.OGbG 1, (t')
where g denines the fiscal stimulus by the government. If fiscal and monetary policy are given hy
g-~, jand m-~,f, respectively, where for simplicity we set P-O, we have:
( dj ~ s 1 ( mal~,-1)t~n[~2-1) mba~
ljl l a~,
. l E~de (nta) l (1-b)t(,B~-RZ) b e dt } 0
where
a g Qó t(Q: f aw)1( I -b)- .






Proposition A. I: Properties of the saddl~ath slop~
(a) Let ~,Gmin{b(1 f~i,)I~1,,ó(I f~n)l~n}. Then awla~.10 for ~zG 1.
(b) Let ~,Gmin{(zb(It~l~)t(~n-1))I(1f~A),(b(lf~J~)trbn)1~)`}. Then w~-I for ~ZZO. In
particular, if {?,-0 (no fiscal stimulus) and óz I12, then w~-1 for ~,ZO.
(c) If ~,2b(ma-I)l~J`, then wyl-~,ló, as ~,f I. Otherwise, w-~Il~a a.c ~.f 1. In particular, if
5,-0 (ta fiscal stimulus) then, if ~A51 then wyl as SZf I, while otherwise wyll~)` as SZf 1.
(d) Let )4,Gá. lf ~ZG 1-bf~„ awla~~0. If ~,-1-bt~„ aw1a~-0. If 1-btS,G,B2G l, awlamGo.
(e) Let ~2-1 (full accommodation). If ~,Zb(~a-1)l~l`, then awla~-0. Otherwise, awla~Go.
(f) Let ~2G min{ I-btS„1}.~n,en awlas, G0.
'[itis proposition generalises the properties of w a.e a function ot' S, to allow for the effects
of a ftscal stimulus. Part (a) states the conditions under which w increases with the degree of
monetary accommodation {4Z. Depending on the degree of fiscal activism, (c) gives the limit of w
as Sz approaches full monetary accommodation. The pegpoint now corresponds to ~2-1-bfs,.
Again, as a function of the degree of monetary accommodation, w pivots around the pegpoint.
Finally, part (f) says that the saddlepath slope decrea.ces in the degree of fiscal activism. Using a
similar pnx:cxture as in section 3.4, we ohtain the a.eymptutic variances of output and the price25
level:
var(p) -(2~)-' Ik~(á~.Qz)vZ f ~(Q~.R~a.' t~(Q~.Q~a.,~l





~~~~~Z) - ( 1-b)2[)`(ltó(1-w))'nC2-l~~-~,l[óa(1-w).n(1-~~-~,1
k~(~,.~2) ~ Z [bawtn(~ztb-1)t1~,)Z .
b(I-b) [b~(1-w)tn(1-~~-~,1[ó),(2-w).n(ltb-l~~-~,]
In order to guarantee the existence of the asymptotic vaziances, we assume that ~,có, ~zc lfitl4,
for 0~~,L b, and i4, t 1 for I4, 50. Since ~, fbm increases in {9„ we have the following
proposition.
Protwsition A.2: Fiscal activism and the optimal degree of monetarv accommodation
(a) Suppose shocks only occur in goods demand. Then, if b-I S~,~b, there exists a degree of
monetary accommodation, say ~, (~8,50), such that ~(lfb(w-1))tnS2t~4,-0. Furthermore,
a~Zla{4,c0. In particular, if [4,-b-1, then ~Z-O.
(b) Suppose shocks only occur in money demand. Then, if 0 514, c b, there exists a degree of
monetary accommodation, say i4Z, such that bkufn(~Ztb-1)t)~,-0. Furthermore, a{3~Ia~,LO.
(c) Suppose only supply shocks occur. Then, if 14,~0, full monetary accommodation (~,-1)
stabilises output.
In other words, part (a) states that, in case of goods demand shocks, for a fiscal policy
which is neither too pro-cyclical nor too counter-cyclical, there exists a(unique) degree of
monetary accommodation (Sz50) which completely stabilises output and producer prices. The
degree of counter-cyclical monetary intervention rises with the degree of fiscal pro-cyclicality. The
intuition is that if a positive goods demand shock provokes a less counter-cyclical fiscal reaction, a
[~(1 tb(w-1))tnly2t~R,1:26
stronger contraction in the money is needed to stabilise output and the producer price level. If
there are only goods demand shocks, choosing a degree of fiscal activism corresponding to Q,-1-
b completely stabilises output and the price level. Hence, using monetary policy to fix the
exchange rate stabilises an economy subject to money demand shocks, while using fiscal policy to
stabilise the exchange rate stabilises an economy subject to goods demand shocks. If fiscal policy
is moderately procyclical, part (b) shows that in case of money demand shocks, there is a(unique)
degree of monetary accommodation which completely stabilises output and producer prices.
Proposition A.3: Effects of more fiscal activism
(a) Suppose there are only goods demand shocks. If there exists a degree of fiscal activism -(1-
á)ci4,có, say ~„ such that a(Itó(m-1))f~~t~,-0, then avar(p)Ia~,10 and avar(y)IaS,~O
for ~, c~, c ó. If for ~,-ó-1, a(1 fó(~-1))tn~Zf ~, ~ 0, then avar(p)~a~, ~ 0 and avar(y)la~, ~0
for -(1-ó)c~,có. In particular, if )4z-0 (no monetary accommodation), then avaz(p)Ia~,~O and
avar(y)lai4, ~0 for -( t~) c i9, có.
(b) Suppose shocks occur only in money demand. If there exists a degree of fiscal activism
Ocs,có, say i4„ such that ól~t~(~Ztó-1)-1-~,-0, then, for OSi4,c~„ avar(p)Iap,cO and
avar(y)la~, c 0, while, for ~, c~, c ó, avar(pyai4,~0 and avar(p)~ai4, ~0.
If, for ~,-0, óJv.rfrl(~~-ó-1)t~,~0, then avarc~)ia,B,~O and avar(y)~a{4,10 for
Os~, c b. If, for ~, -ó, óawf~()SZt á-1) t~, c 0, then avar(p)Iap,c 0 and avar(y)Iap, c0 for
05S,có. In particular, let {42-0 (no monetary accommodation). If )`c(It~n)(I-ó)l~b, then
avar(p)Ia~,c0 and avar(y)la{3, c 0 for Os~, c ó. Otherwise, there exists a degree of fiscal
activism OS~,có, say i4„ such that óllwfp(~BZfó-l)f),{4,-0.
(c) If there are only supply shocks, avar(p)Ia,B,~ 0 and avar(y)18~, c 0 for ~, c 0.
In part (a) the degree of fiscal activism is restricted to be neither too counter-cyclical nor
too procyclical. If shocks come from goods demand and if there exists a degree of fiscal activism
which completely stabilises output and producer prices, then, beyond this value for S„ vaz(p) and
var(y) monotonously increase in the degree of fiscal activism. Similarly for the case of goods
demand shocks. Hence, with goods or money demand shocks, the effects of a more pro-cyclical
fisca! policy go in the same direction both for var(p) and var(y). With supply shocks, however,
the effects on vaz(p) and var(y) move in opposite directions.27
Appendix 2: Monte Carlo simulations
The simulation technique is based on Duffie and Singleton (1988). Prior to simulation, the
second-order ordinary differential equation (12) is solved numerically for the function 0(n. Given
roughly 200 points of this function between the boundaries of the band, intermediate points were
found using linear interpolation of the two nearest points. Third-order polynomial interpolation
(Davis and Rabinowitz, 1975) yields results that are hardly different. To simulate the structural
continuous-time model, it must be discretised. The parameter values that have been chosen
correspond to a unit time interval. First, given p„ v„ w„ t, and a number of draws from the
normal disvibution for the additive shocks, p,,,, v,,,, w,,, (hence, f,,,) can be calwlated as a
linear combinations of these variables. Second, one can calculate e,,,~Q(~;,,) from the numerical
solution of iJ(~. It is straightforward to calculate the simulated values of other eodogeneous
variables as well.
Clearly, this discretisation is much too coarse and estimates of asymptotic vaziances basad
on this discretisation are inconsistent. Better approximations are obtained if the model is simulated
at a higher frequency. Hence, in practice each unit of time is divided into n parts and n in-
between simulations are performed over each of the T unit time intervals. Of course, the
parameter values are adjusted to allow for the higher sampling frequency. Similarly, the variances
of the shocks are adjusted to allow for the higher frequency, i.e. a;ln replaces a; (i-p,v,w).
Although more sophisticated schemes are available, a simple firstorder Euter scheme óas been
used in the simulations presented in this paper. Duffie and Singleton (1988) show that consistent
estimation of the variances of the variables requires a minimal ratio nIT, at which both n and T
should go to infinity.
The set-up of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure is as follows. From a long time
series, N series of T observations are drawn, making sure to throw away a number of
observations between subsequent sequences of T observations. A grid of size n is used for the in-
between simulations. in practice, typical values were n-25, N-10 and T-1000. If n tends to
infinity, the discrete approximation to the continuous-time distribution becomes exact. Because all
variables are defined to have an asymptotic mean equal to zero and n is chosen to be relatively
large, the test statistic
s,,;2.(x,? t x~,Z t... t xr~lT, i-1,2,...,N
is approximately an unbiased estimator of the unconditional variance of the variable z. Cleazly,
S; .(s,,,' t s,,,' t... s,,N~)IN
is also an estimator of the unconditional variance of x. The statistic
[(s~.~'-5~~2 t ... t (s..N'-S,~']l[N(N-1)1zs
á approximately an unbiased estimator of the variance of 5,-, given that the number of
observationa thrown away between subsequeM sequences of T observations is large enough to rule
out serial corretation between the s,,;~.29
Table 1: Variances of output and lhe price level under an unrestricted dirty float
(a) var(y) under various targets and different shocks
Regime Gaods demand shocks Money demand shocks Supply shocks
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increase ia tlu lona-run eomponmt (K) of the fundamental.
(a) Low degree of monetary aawmmodation (~c 1-~
fundsm~tal (Q
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accommodation ccefficient (~Figure 3: Varisnces of output (and producer prices) under various widths
of the nominal exchange rete band and various sources of shocks.












(c) Var(y) under supply-side shocks only (ap~0)
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Note: UDF refers to unrestricted dirty float, while t2.25Ao and tó9fo refer to the
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